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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes a plan generation software for maritime interdiction 
tactical operation using conceptual blending theory (CBT) and software blending 
mechanism. CBT explains how human think using mental spaces and mental 
operators. This paper uses CBT to model Boyd’s Observation-Orientation-
Decision-Act Loop Theory, a mental process used by military commanders to 
make decision. Bio-inspired operators are used to monitor cues from the real 
world. Expert’s experiences were captured using a similar strategy implemented 
in the threat assessment model created by Liebhaber and Feher. Probability 
Estimates of Events (PEoE) are used to represent the significance of each 
possible tactic used by potential threats. Several PEoE are used to represent the 
mental patterns used to recognize a threat situation. Finally, decision is derived 
using linear assignment, an optimality approach that considers threat attack 
probability, goals and interdiction resource effectiveness. Experienced naval 
warfare officers have given positive feedback on the results presented and 
commented that the model resembles the cognitive process of a decision-maker 
in tactical plan generation. The model has also been tested in a Simkit-based 
simulator to coordinate patrol craft’s maritime interdiction process. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
With more than 60000 ships passing through Singapore each year, the 
Singapore Strait is among the most important waterways in the world [1]. The 
mission to closely investigate each vessel for terrorism or piracy activities is 
nearly impossible with just a few patrol craft and navy vessels. An automated 
decision support system will be useful to plan for the maritime interdiction 
resources with different capabilities for different maritime interdiction tasks. 
The thesis aims to demonstrate an automated decision support capability 
using conceptual blending theory [26], [30] and software blending mechanism 
created by Professor Hiles at the Naval Postgraduate School [27], [32]. 
Conceptual Blending Theory explains how humans think using mental spaces 
and mental operators. This thesis uses Conceptual Blending Theory to model 
Boyd’s Observation-Orientation-Decision-Act Loop Theory, a mental process 
used by military commanders to make decision [13]. Recognition strategy [40] is 
used in the conduct of threat assessment and is implemented using bio-inspired 
operators [27] to monitor cues from the real world. Surface warfare experts’ 
experiences are captured using a similar strategy implemented in the threat 
assessment model created by Liebhaber and Feher [28]. Probability estimates of 
events are used to represent the significance of each possible tactic used by 
potential threats. Several estimates of events can be used to represent the 
mental patterns used to recognize a particular threat situation.  This resembles 
the human’s inductive reasoning process using bounded rationality [35]. Finally, 
decision is derived using linear assignment, an optimality approach that 
considers threat attack probability, goals and interdiction resource effectiveness. 
The simulated situational display, together with the threat assessment and 
decision suggested by the plan generation Software have been demonstrated to 
experienced naval littoral water surface warfare officers. Their feedback was 
encouraging and commented that such a decision support system will greatly 
assist decision makers in the maritime interdiction process.  With this, the thesis 
 xiv
has achieved its objective by using several novel theories to develop a plan-
generation software design that resembles the cognitive process of a decision-
maker. The thesis has also demonstrated a simplified form of adaptive display 
and proposed a way to represent a mental pattern of a particular situation. Such 
a mental pattern can be used to represent atypical situations, which an expert 
has never experienced before.  
 xv
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A. PORT OF SINGAPORE 
1.   Singapore 
In 2006, Singapore was the world’s busiest port: the shipping tonnage 
hit an unprecedented 1.3-billion gross tons (GT) [1]. The container traffic 
reached 24.8 million Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units (TEUs), and the total cargo 
tonnage handled registered 448.2 million tons. This is not surprising since 
about 30 percent of the world’s trade and 50 percent of the world’s energy 
passes through the Straits of Singapore each year [2]. There are about two 
hundred shipping lines that converge in the Singapore Strait with links to more 
than six hundred ports in over a hundred and twenty countries. As a result, 
the littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are so important that 
they received international support from fifty countries and seventeen 
maritime-related organizations during the launch of the Co-operative 
Mechanism [3].  
2.   Piracy and Terrorism 
However, this bloom in maritime traffic is complicated by occurrences 
of piracy. In the fall of 2005, the Harvard Asia Quarterly reported that piracy 
activities, some of which were related to terrorist networks, occurred on a 
daily basis in the region [5]. The Quarterly also emphasized that Southeast 
Asia is a “fertile ground” for piracy and estimated that piracy costs range from 
as low as US$250 million to US$16 billion a year. The Institute of Defence 
and Strategic Studies (IDSS) attributes the piracy activities to separatist 
groups in Indonesia. It reported that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore 
have a high risk of maritime terrorist attack due to the narrow waterways, high 
volume of maritime traffic, and the many ships that carry highly volatile or 
dangerous cargo [2]. 
Although maritime terrorism is unlikely, it would have a huge impact on 
“the transportation systems, and the possible economic consequences of a 
disruption of shipping traffic” [2]. Furthermore, Singapore is a prime terrorist 
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target because more than 12,000 oil tankers and 3,000 chemical tankers call 
at Singapore each year, with a substantial amount of oil and chemicals [6]. 
Despite its vulnerability, however, the chief executive of the Singapore 
Maritime Port Authority (MPA) confirmed that MPA would ensure the safety 
and security aspect of the port [4]. In addition, America’s war on terrorism has 
placed high emphasis on maritime security and plays a strong role in 
promoting maritime security [5].  
B. ANTI-PIRACY SECURITY MEASURES 
1.   International Effort 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has mandated the 
carriage of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) on board ships of 300 or 
more gross tonnage and all passenger ships [7]. The AIS broadcasts 
important information about a ship such as its unique ID, speed, position, 
heading, size, cargo, etc. [8], and greatly enhances the situational picture at 
the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS). VTS is a maritime traffic monitoring system 
that fuses data information from radar, AIS, cameras, and voice 
communication. The IMO has also introduced an International Ship and Port 
Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) to create security requirements for 
vessels and port facilities [5]. 
2.   Regional Effort 
In the region, the International Maritime Organization and the littoral 
states have introduced a mandatory ship reporting scheme for the Malacca 
and Singapore Straits known as STRAITREP, which facilitates and enhances 
identification and communication between ships and shore-based authorities 
[9]. Many security measures have also been introduced by the Maritime Port 
Authority, such as restricted access to waters surrounding high-value 
installations, screening of containers, and enhancing of security at sea-entry 
checkpoints. Other measures include face-to-face checks for crew and an 
increased presence of patrol craft. The selective escort of sensitive vessels in 
the port waters and Singapore Straits is carried out by Sea Security Teams 
(ASSeT) [6]. To improve surveillance coverage, the littoral states have also 
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installed several new radars, such as the Surface Picture Surveillance System 
(SURPIC) for the Singapore Strait, by Singapore and Indonesia [10]; new 
radars at Changi Naval Base, by Singapore [11]; and the Marine Electronic 
Highway (MEH) along the Malacca Strait, by Malaysia [12].  
C. MARITIME INTERDICTION 
1.   Surveillance and Data Fusion 
In maritime interdiction, a distinction must be made between the 
operational nature of “surveillance” and “physical presence” [2]. Most of the 
measures that have been introduced fall under the “surveillance” category. 
Systems such as SURPIC, MEH, and AIS mainly improve situation 
awareness coverage which is important for decision-making. Boyd writes that 
there is a need for improvement in sensor and communication coverage, 
faster processing power, better display devices, and good fusion facilities [13]. 
With so many surveillance systems in place churning out loads of contact 
data, it is desirable to fuse these heterogeneous sources to form a composite 
situational display. A fused situational picture will facilitate a more effective 
decision-making process. Data fusion of different radar systems is a well-
studied area [21, 22], and the fusion of radar and electro-optic sensors has 
also been demonstrated [23]. Data fusion of AIS and radar has been 
demonstrated by Dalian Maritime University [24]. Information from the above 
mentioned surveillance system, together with the detection from 
communication (COMINT) and electronics intelligence (ELINT), as well as 
high-level reports from sources such as patrol craft and neutral shipping, can 
be used to infer information and even the intentions of the contact (hostile, 
friendly, neutral, or unknown) with the use of multi-agent systems [25].  
2.   Physical Presence 
The other aspect, which is physical presence, is also very important. 
Physical presence can be enhanced by conducting ship and aircraft patrols. 
Physical presence is good for deterrence and interdiction purposes, including 
close-range observation and even boarding of a suspicious ship. Physical 
presence will also allow fast response for search and rescue operations. 
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Examples of patrols include the coordinated naval patrols conducted by 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore (Operation MALSINDO), which were 
implemented in July 2004, and “Eye in the Sky” [2].  
3.   Roles 
Surveillance is the responsibility of the Maritime Port Authority, whose 
main role is to manage vessel traffic to ensure navigational safety and 
port/maritime security [14]. The physical presence role is covered by the 
Police Coast Guard (PCG) and the Singapore Navy (RSN). The PCG’s role is 
to ensure law and order and prevent and detect crime within Singapore’s 
territorial waters [15], while the navy is responsible for the defense of 
Singapore against sea-borne threats and the protection of the sea lines of 
communications that encompass the Singapore Strait and its access routes 
[16].  
4.   Unmanned Surface Vessels 
The Navy’s latest initiative is the evaluation of the Spartan [17] , [18] 
and Protector [19] unmanned surface vehicle’s (USV) ability to conduct ship 
inspection and to protect the anchorage. Each USV is equipped with video 
camera, radar, and communication systems to provide live-feed video images 
back to the base. However, the unmanned system has its own limitations, 
such as the absence of a ship-boarding capability. After the positive 
identification of a suspicious target, manned patrol craft (PC) must still be 
deployed to board the suspicious vessel for the interception task. Throughout 
this thesis, the manned patrol craft and unmanned surface vessels are termed 
“interdiction resources.”  
D. DECISION MAKERS’ COGNITIVE CHALLENGES 
With up to a thousand ships in the Singapore Strait at any one time and 
sixty high-speed passenger ferries plying the waters between Singapore and 
the Indonesian islands every day, cutting across the busy shipping lanes of 
the Strait [1], it is a challenging task for an operator to track the intentions of 
every ship. Even with a composite situational picture, it is still a tedious task 
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for an operator to evaluate the thousands of contacts displayed on the Vessel 
Traffic System (VTS). The challenge is further increased during a decision-
making process to determine which patrol craft or USV should investigate 
which contact.  
The decision maker’s ability to think may be affected by confusion, 
overwhelmed senses, debilitation, or paralysis [20]. The quality of the decision 
may be affected by cognitive tunnel vision in which the decision maker’s 
attention is distracted due to cognitive overload. As a result, the decision-
making process may be biased. The quality of the decision may also be 
affected by information overload if the decision maker is unable to establish 
situation awareness because of inaccurate, missing, or ambiguous data in a 
cluttered environment. In addition to hardware influences, Boyd [13] writes, 
“the implicit nature of human beings” should also be emphasized. Difficulties 
in the contact evaluation process may prevent the effective deployment of the 
interdiction resources. Boyd emphasizes that, to make a sound decision, 
there is a need for insight and vision “to unveil an adversary’s plans and 
actions, as well as foresee one’s own goals and appropriate plans and 
actions.”  
E. PLAN GENERATION OBJECTIVES FOR MARITIME INTERDICTION 
Given the high density of shipping traffic in the Singapore straits, the 
coordination and tasking of USVs and PCs to ensure security in the straits will 
be a laborious task and cognitively challenging. The main objective of a plan-
generation decision support system in maritime interdiction is optimal 
deployment of interdiction platforms to investigate shipping traffics.  
The first research question that this thesis will address is whether a 
conceptual blending theory [26] can be used to model Boyd’s OODA mental 
process [13] to generate plans for maritime interdiction. The second research 
question is whether the bio-inspired operator “ticket” can be used to deduce a 
contact’s course-of-action [27]. Finally, the third research question is whether 
software blending that is implemented using the Compounded Multi-Agent 
System (CMAS) library [27] can be used to support real-time plan generation.  
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The plan generation process has two sub-objectives: contact course-
of-action (CCOA) analysis and Interdiction resources course-of-action 
development (ICOA). The first objective of the plan generation process is to 
determine if the contact course-of-action model can be derived from the 
composite situation picture through “focus and direction” [13]. Then, each 
contact can be prioritized according to its inferred attributes, such as attack 
probability and time criticalness.  
The second objective of the plan generation system is to be able to 
deploy interdiction resources to a high-priority threat so as to maximize 
effectiveness. Each interdiction will have different capabilities. For example, a 
manned patrol craft will have police officers on board who are able to perform 
the boarding tasks required to halt a ship. However, an unmanned surface 
vessel is better for close-in investigation of suspicious craft. Thus, the 
capabilities of the craft selected for an interdiction must match the particular 
characteristics of the suspected threat.  
F. THESIS SCOPE  
The scope of the thesis is to model the Boyd’s OODA mental process 
[23] using the conceptual blending theory [26] to develop course-of-action for 
maritime interdiction resources. The conceptual blending theory will be 
implemented using the NPS CMAS Library [27]. A multi-agent system will be 
used to model the human expert in the process of the threat course-of-action 
identification. The threat assessment model is based on Surface Warfare 
Threat Assessment [28]. It is assumed that a composite situational picture will 
be available for the plan generation process. The contact course-of-action will 
be inferred from both low- and high-level data. The low-level data will include 
Kinematics and ship attributes available from radar, the AIS system, and 
intelligence systems, while the high-level data will include spot reports from a 
neutral shipping or video system. A Simkit-based simulator was built on top of 
the simulator developed for the NPS SEA Integrated Project for Port Security 
Strategy 2012 [29]. The purpose of the simulator is to assess the usefulness 
of the plan generation system. Though the interception process is modeled, 
the minor details of the boarding process, such as fire exchange, boarding, 
 7
shipboard search, and the rescue process is not explicitly modeled. As this is 
a proof-of-concept demonstrator, the attributes used in the plan generation 
process may not be exhaustive.  
G. MOTIVATION 
The plan generation process was inspired by the NPS SEA Integrated 
Project for Port Security Strategy 2012 [29]. The Port Security Strategy 
proposes a conceptual system of systems to improve port security measures. 
The scenario includes a combination of static and mobile sensors to provide 
surveillance coverage for the port of Oakland. Mobile resources, such as 
unmanned surface vessels and patrol craft were scripted in fixed patrol 
routes, which are not optimized. It would be better if a plan generator were 
available to manage the maritime interdiction resource deployment. The 
simulator used for the study was enhanced to incorporate features required 
for the plan generation process.  
This thesis was also inspired by Tan’s Master’s thesis on the MAS 
Intent identification System [25]. Tan demonstrated the use of a conceptual 
blending theory and the MAS concept to infer the intention of each track, 
classified as Hostile, Neutral, Friendly, and Unknown. The MAS is also able to 
detect swarm-like coordinated strikes.  
 8
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II. LITERATURE SURVEY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Within the context of this thesis, the relevant theories are the following: 
conceptual blending theory, software blending mechanism, Boyd’s 
observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop theory, Probability 
Estimates of Events, Threat Assessment model, Inducting Reasoning, 
Recognition Primed Decision Making and Discrete Event Simulation & Simkit. 
The relevant work done in plan generation is also briefly described. Some 
related work, which are described in details, are the Commander Model in 
Joint Warfare System; the Course-of-Action Analysis (COAA) Concept 
Exploration effort by DARPA; the Course-of-Action Simulation Analysis by 
Ohio State University; the Recognition Primed Decision Agent; the 
Operational-Level Naval Planning Using Agent-Based Simulation at NPS; and 
the Air and Surface Threat Assessment at NPS.  
B. THEORY  
1. Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT) 
The Conceptual Blending Theory developed by Coulson [30] and 
Fauconnier and Turner [26], describes the way humans process and 
rationalize information through a set of mental operations. In their book, 
Fauconnier and Turner present various examples that show how the theory of 
conceptual blending is one possible explanation of the way humans think. The 
theory also explains the process by which humans assign meaning to 
incoming information from sensory input, integrate it, and thus learn and gain 
knowledge. 
Conceptual blending is a set of operations in which mental spaces are 
integrated to form new mental spaces. Mental spaces are small conceptual 
packets, interconnected in the working memory, that are constructed when 
humans think and talk. Within the mental spaces are elements of knowledge 
that are structured by long-term schematic frames called “organizing frames,” 
which shape or govern the elements in the mental space. The mental spaces 
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are interconnected and modified as thoughts and discourse unfolds. For 
example, in shipping traffic contact analysis, each of the shipping traffic’s 
intentions, in terms of attack probability and attack tactics, against each high-
value unit present can be derived by using the predator-prey frame during the 
process of constructing the hypothesis blend. The predator-prey frame 
suggests that there are several ways that a predator can attack a particular 
prey. Similarly, there are various ways that a terrorist ship can attack a high-
value unit. The attack probability of each tactic can be modeled by using a 
multi-agent system.  
Fauconnier and Turner [26] suggest that humans are unconsciously, 
constantly blending when they are talking, listening, and imagining, in every 
aspect of human life. The blending process happens at fast speed and is able 
to generate many blends in parallel. The blended space can, in turn, serve as 
input space for subsequent blends, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   Complex Integration Network (From [31]) 
A simple integration network is shown in Figure 2. There are two input 
spaces connected by solid lines that represent cross-mapping among related 
elements in both input spaces through “vital relationship.” The generic mental 
space contains the rules for the blending process and guides it by selectively 
projecting the elements from the input spaces into the blended space as 
shown by the dotted lines. The blended space contains the newly projected 




blended space. The links between the mental input spaces are known as 
“outer-space” links and are compressed into an “inner-space” link inside the 
blend. The blend is generated through: 
a.  Composition of projected elements from the input spaces. For 
example, each of the hypothesis blends is composed of one 
contact, one high-value unit, and one attack tactic. 
b.  Completion is based on independently recruited frames and 
scenarios. For example, with the attributes of the contact and 
high-value unit, the attack tactic is computed for its attack 
probability based on past experiences which represent the 
recruited frames and scenarios. 
c. Elaboration through mental simulations is based on the new 
organizing frame. This is known as “running the blend” that 
models the process of a human being anticipating results or 
consequences by thinking or imagining into the future. In the 
maritime terrorist example, after composition and completion, 
the process of elaboration will compute the time that the contact 




Figure 2.   Simple Integration Network (From [27]) 
After the blending process has ended, the projected or simulated 
counter-factual conclusion that resulted from the elaboration process can be 
back-projected into the input space to add meaning and understanding to the 
input spaces. For example, after the elaboration process, the tactic hypothesis 
blend with the highest attack probability can be back-projected into the 
contact input space to indicate the level-of-attack probability of the contact. 
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Similarly, the elaboration process can also back-project vulnerability to the 
high-value-unit input space to indicate its vulnerability to terrorist attack.  
In addition to the elements composed from the input spaces, the newly 
blended space compressed the vital relationship between the input spaces, 
known as the outer-space link, into the inner-space link in the blended space. 
Fauconnier and Turner claim that it is this compression ability that allows a 
human being to gain “global” insight and human-scale understanding” [26, ch. 
16]. The term “compression” in cognitive science refers to “transforming 
diffuse and distended conceptual structures that are less congenial to human 
understanding so that they become more congenial to human understanding, 
better suited to our human-scale ways of thinking.” The resultant compressed 
inner link can then be uncompressed anywhere in the blending network in 
order to access the mental spaces associated in the blended space. Some of 
the vital links identified are Change, Cause–Effect, Time, Space, Identity, 
Change, Uniqueness, Part–Whole, Representation, Role, Analogy, 
Disanalogy, Property, Similarity, Category, and Intentionality [26, p. 101].  
There are four types of blending networks. In a simple blending 
network, the cross-mappings between input spaces are usually a frame to 
values connection. The relevant part of the frame in one input is projected 
with its roles, and the elements are projected from the other input as values of 
those roles in the blend. For example, when blending a high-value-unit input 
space and a terrorist input space, the generic space seeded with the high-
value-unit input space and an attack tactic looks for a predator that will form a 
relationship with the high-value unit using that attack tactic.  
A mirror network is an integration network in which all spaces (inputs, 
generic, and blend) share an organizing frame. For example, during the 
elaboration process, when both the threat and the high-value unit are 
simulated in the same area of operation with the same environment, both are 
projected to the same organizing frame. This is necessary in order to derive 
all the information, such as position of collision, time to collision, and distance 
to collision.  
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In a single scope network, there are at least two input spaces, each 
with a different organizing frame. One of the organizing frames from one of 
the input spaces is projected to organize the blend. The organizing frame of 
the blend is an extension of the organizing frame of one of the input spaces, 
but not the other. Fauconnier and Turner use the illustration of a company’s 
chief executive officer (CEO) “fighting” with another company’s CEO. The 
illustration blends the business context with the sport of boxing. The frame 
that is being projected is from the business input space instead of the boxing 
input space since it is a business, not a sport competition that is taking place. 
In a double scope blend, where both inputs have different organizing frames, 
the blended space‘s organizing frame is made up of parts of each of those 
frames and has an emergent structure of its own; that is, a new type of 
organizing frame is created by the double-scope blend. Fauconnier and 
Turner cite the illustration of a computer desktop, which is a combination of 
computer frame and an office desktop frame.  
2. Software Blending Using a Multi-Agent System 
Professor J.E. Hiles [27], [32] demonstrated the Conceptual Blending 
Theory using software blending in Project IAGO, using multi-agent 
coordination techniques motivated by the biochemistry of biological cells. The 
software blending was implemented using multi-agent systems that 
coordinate activities using three-key bio-inspired operators called Membrane, 
Connector, and Ticket.  
The membrane is the common environment within which all the related 
mental spaces such as generic space, input space, and blended space exist. 
For example, the contact, high-value unit, interdiction resources, and all 
resultant blended spaces are projected into the same membrane.  
Connectors that resemble the receptors and control in biological cells 
are used to connect one space to another. There are two types of connectors: 
stimulus and response. Stimulus connectors are used by mental spaces to 
project some of their elements into the membrane. Response connectors are 
“query-like” operators that request elements from the membrane. For 
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example, when a contact input space is projected into the membrane, 
knowledge elements (e.g., a sensed state) that are ready for further 
processing are extended as stimulus connectors. The generic space for 
forming hypotheses will extend response connectors to look for new contacts 
with sensed-state equals to an unknown or hostile state.  
Tickets contain the procedural information for agents. Each ticket 
contains several frames with each frame having individual receptors either 
extended or retracted, depending on the state in each frame. Each frame can 
be in either an active or a dormant state. There are two types of tickets: data 
or operational. Data tickets are used to gather information from the “world 
outside the ticket,” while an operation ticket contains the sequence of 
operation. The sequence of operation of corresponding tickets will be 
executed when two connectors match. The connections formed are 
persistence and scale-free, which can then be used to built the blending 
network. Examples of data tickets include many reactive agents for contact, 
high-value-unit and interdiction-resources input spaces, for monitoring the real 
world environment and updating states in the membrane. An example of an 
operational ticket is the contact course-of-action hypothesis ticket in which 
each frame represents one cue that a human operator uses in threat 
assessment.  
Project IAGO has successfully applied computational models to 
anticipate asymmetric threat operations. The project used the notion of a 
compounded multi-agent system (Figure 3) in which multi-agent were used to 
represent the mental spaces within agents having the cognitive capability to 
produce “bottom-up” knowledge structures grown through the process of 
conceptual blending. One of IAGO’s important approaches has been to focus 
on the perspective of a subject instead of on the observer’s point of view. It 
used a perceptual filter to analyze a series of complex events by applying 
meaning to key incoming events so to construct meaning for the subject. For 
example, if a series of events in an maritime threat scenario indicate that 
“Threat is inside near range” + “Threat is approaching” + “Threat is a small 
ship” + “Threat contains small crew size” + “Threat is heavily laden” + “Threat 
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is moving fast,” a “suicide bombing” ticket will generate a higher probability 
than a “neutral ticket.” The key mechanism used for such a complex event 
analysis is the ticket, which is capable of continuous adjustments based on 
incoming event variations and goal orientation.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Compounded Multi-agent System. 
3. Boyd’s OODA Loop Theory 
Boyd’s OODA (Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action) loop is a 
theory of knowledge formation [13]. The OODA loop describes how humans 
construct mental models of their environment both through immediate 
observation and orientation and under the influence of experience, culture, 
history, genetics, etc. These mental models are then used to decide on a 
course-of-action. The outcomes of the decision are known through 
subsequent observation. The OODA is depicted in Figure 4. Observation is 
the information collected about the enemy and the environment. Orientation is 
the analysis of the information collected. Decision is the selection of a course-
of-action from the alternatives. Action is the implementation of the course-of-
action selected.  
A simple cause and effect analysis is ineffective mainly because of the 
nature of the dynamics and the ill-structured and ill-defined characteristics of 
the problem space. The efficacy of the OODA loop is attributed mainly to its 
ability to overcome the problems of friction, limited time, and enemy action. 
Friction introduces non-rational outcomes which cannot be anticipated and is 
impacted by several unknowable variables in any plan or action. Limited time 
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restricts the ability to collect and digest information. Enemy action refers to the 
fact that the enemy is constantly adapting and changing its course-of-action 
based on its adversary’s course-of-action. The OODA loop occurs 
continuously. After the action process, the observation process starts 
immediately, with new information constantly collected, analyzed, and used 
for subsequent processes.  
Boyd writes that orientation represents images, views, and impressions 
of the world that are shaped by genetic heritage, cultural tradition, previous 
experiences, and unfolding circumstances. It is an interactive process of 
many-sided implicit cross-referencing projections, empathies, correlation, and 
rejection. Orientation is the most important part of the OODA loop because it 
shapes the way one observes, decides, and acts as well as the ability or 
inability to conduct many-sided implicit cross-referencing.  
This thesis uses conceptual blending theory to describe the OODA 
process. The observation process is implemented using reactive agents. The 
orientation process is implemented using operational ticket agents. The 
decision is implemented through the analysis of counter-contact course-of-
action goals and the forming of own course-of-action alternatives.  Then, 





Figure 4.   OODA Loop taken (From [13].)  
4. Military Decision-Making Using Probability Estimates of 
Events 
Military decision-making often involves a process using probability 
estimates of events to choose between different course-of-actions in battle 
[20]. Reeves [20, Table 1] uses five general characteristics to characterize an 
environment of extreme information ambiguity: friction, ambiguity, time 
pressure, delayed action-feedback loops, and high stakes. Friction can be 
caused by external factors such as enemy action or an adverse environmental 
condition. It can also be caused by internal conflicts because of management 
and technology challenges, or the complexity of the task. Ambiguity can be 
caused by a discrepancy in the data, the coverage of the rules of 
engagement, or the commander’s intent. Time pressure is mainly caused by a 
lack of information when a decision must be made. Delayed action-feedback 
loops and high stakes are self-explanatory.  
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In a maritime interdiction scenario, in order to deploy maritime 
interdiction resources to investigate potentially suspicious ships among the 
busy ship traffic, probability estimates of each ship’s intentions need to be 
established in order to prioritize the investigation process. First, several attack 
hypotheses are created for each contact/high-value-unit pair. Then, each 
hypothesis is assigned with a probability estimate to indicate its attack 
probability using the associated tactics. That contact is then prioritized 
according to the inferred attack probability for the interdiction process.  
5. Threat Assessment 
Liebhaber and Feher [28] investigated the threat assessment process 
used by experienced surface warfare personnel. Data were collected from 
experienced watch-standers and used to develop a surface threat 
assessment algorithm as part of the decision support system (DSS). The DSS 
can be used to support the cognitive process of surface warfare personnel 
operating in highly complex, fast-paced littoral environments. The DSS will 
help the decision maker to assess and rank contacts in order to develop 
appropriate a course-of-action either to reduce threat uncertainty or to 
neutralize the threat. The first part of their investigation was to categorize the 
various types of platforms into five different threat levels in littoral or open 
waters. Then, the following cues were used to either increase or decrease the 
likelihood of the threat: speed, heading, Closest Point of Approach (CPA), 
recent maneuvers, distance, cargo, number of vessels, sea lane, Electronics 
Support Measure (ESM), coordinated activity, voice communication, own 
support in area, destination, weapons envelope, and regional intelligence.  
In this thesis, threat assessment is implemented using the operational 
ticket to derive a probability estimate associated with the attack tactics. Each 
frame will have a response connector extended to query for a cue for threat 
assessment. The set of cues is similar to but not exactly the same as the set 
used by Liebhaber and Feher because of a slight different in application 
context. The thesis focuses on detecting piracy and terrorist activities among 
the civilian shipping.  
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6. Bounded Rationality and Inductive Reasoning 
Classical decision theory is based on instrumental rationality in which 
decisions take place under three conditions: certainty, risk, and uncertainty 
[33]. According to this theory, decisions are rational choices that are made by 
maximizing expected utility. This implies that all possible choices and 
associated probabilities with the payoff must be known in advance [34]. 
However, all possible choices and associated probabilities are usually not 
available for maritime interdiction planning, which is usually based on 
incomplete, inaccurate, or subjective information. Nevertheless, Arthur [35] 
suggests that human beings are not good at deductive logic but are rather 
good at pattern recognition and inductive reasoning. During the reasoning 
process, several hypotheses will be formed that will be strengthened, 
weakened, or even replaced according to input arriving from the environment.  
In the course of planning and the decision-making process, human 
beings will attempt to conduct situational reasoning. In addition, the reasoning 
process usually exhibits bounded rationality, because decisions are usually 
made with incomplete and conflicting information [36]. This is in line with 
Tversky and Kahneman’s study which finds that human beings do not usually 
make rational choices but choices that can easily be biased based on their 
personal experiences or preferences [37]. Simon [36] suggests that other 
psychological processes must then be required for decision-making. Arthur 
[35] proposes that an inductive reasoning approach enables human beings to 
deal with complications and an ill-defined problem space. Inductive reasoning 
can be modeled with several heterogeneous agents assigned with various 
hypotheses or subjective beliefs. Each agent will keep track of his own private 
collection-of-beliefs model, strengthening or weakening it as events unfold.  
According to this theory, several hypotheses can be created for one 
contact. These hypotheses will be either strengthened or weakened according 
to cues arriving from the external environment. By assigning a different weight 
by which the attack probability is either increased or decreased, each cue that 
arrives can be interpreted independently and according to human experience. 
Each hypothesis, an operation-ticket agent, then autonomously adjusts its 
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attack probability. All hypothesis tickets will have a different attack probability, 
updated based on experience. The overall pattern in attack probability will be 
able to model the human inductive reasoning process dynamically, even 
under rapidly changing conditions.   
7. Recognition-Primed Decision Making 
According to Wikipedia, Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) as a 
“framework emerged as a means of studying how people actually make 
decisions and perform cognitively complex functions in demanding situations” 
[38]. Salas and Klein describe NDM as “the effort to understand and improve 
decision making in field settings” [39]. Both describe NDM as a descriptive 
theory. Both note that situations are usually characterized by stress, time 
pressure, uncertainty, vague goals, ambiguous information, high stakes, team 
and organizational constraints, dynamic conditions, and varying amounts of 
experience. As can be seen, NDM is different from the classical decision-
making theory in which, options are usually not available.  
Klein developed the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model to 
explain how a human expert makes a decision in an emergency situation [40]. 
The Integrated version of the RPD model is given in Figure 5. The study 
described several interesting aspects of the RPD model. 
In what is termed the “singular evaluation approach,” the decision 
maker does not compare options but evaluates them in isolation. While the 
comparative evaluation approach aims for optimizing the effect, the singular 
evaluation approach aims for “satisfying,” that is, determining whether the first 
option that comes to mind satisfies the requirements of that particular 
circumstance. Optimizing is usually difficult while satisfying is more efficient.  
Each option is evaluated through a process of mental simulation to 
identify flaws in the decision. If there is no problem, the option is executed; 
otherwise, the next option is evaluated. The decision-making process is fast, 
less than one minute. There are three variations in the decision-making 
process: 
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• The situation is recognized as typical and familiar. In this 
variation, the decision-maker is clear about the goal, cues, 
expectancy, and action.  
• The situation is atypical. A remedy procedure such as seeking 
for more information or story-telling is required to understand the 
situation.  
• The course-of-action contains flaws, which can be identified 
through mental simulation.   
In this thesis, recognition of a typical situation can be implemented 
using the operation ticket agent to monitor all relevant cues to identify a 
typical situation. A typical situation is a contact course-of-action, with cues 
drawn from the composite situational picture. The expectancies in this 
situation will be based on the course-of-action hypothesis. The action taken in 
the course-of-action is the deployment of interdiction resources. So far, the 
process only addresses the first variation. The second variation is one that 
lacks information about a suspicious craft. In this situation, an unmanned 
surface vessel is deployed to gather more information before deploying police 
coast guards to board the craft. The third variation is one in which none of the 
interdiction resources are able to counter the contact in time. In this 





Figure 5.   Integrated Version of the Recognition-primed Decision-making 
Model (From [41] 
8. Discrete Event Simulation and Simkit 
The event-based simulator developed for this thesis to test the plan 
generation demonstrator was based on the event graph paradigm [49], [50], 
[51] and can be built based on a suite of Java library call Simkit [52]. The 
LEGOS framework [53] can be used to organize a large-scale simulator into 
several smaller components for easy development. The Discrete Event 
paradigm and the Simkit library have made provisions for the sensing and 
movement models found in [54].  
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C. RELATED WORK 
1. Commander Model in the Joint Warfare System (JWARS) 
In the Joint Warfare System (JWARS), the Commander Model (CM) is 
used to perform situation assessment and course-of-action (COA) selection,   
while the Commander Behavior Model (CBM) is used to bias decisions in 
keeping with a commander’s leadership style [48]. The CM is a hybrid artificial 
intelligence system that models doctrine with fuzzy rule sets, together with a 
tree-based lookahead algorithm for the strategy. The CBM employs behavior-
based fuzzy rule sets to augment the CM in assessing the situation, and in 
biasing the COA selection criteria. The CBM extends from the Myers-Briggs 
personality traits to link personality traits to military attitudes, consequences, 
and values. The resulting sets of values are combined to select a specific 
course-of-action with an auditable trail using fuzzy rule sets. The CM/CBM is 
applicable to decisions from multiple echelons. 
2. U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s 
(DARPA) Course-of-Action Analysis (COAA) and Concept 
Exploration Effort  
The U.S. Army uses the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) 
described in Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, to 
prepare for a combat operation [49]. The decision-making process is a 
specialization of the general decision-making process: understanding the 
problem, proposing alternatives, analyzing each alternative, comparing them, 
and selecting one to execute. These processes can be summarized as: 
mission analysis, course-of-action (COA) development, and COA analysis. 
Mission analysis involves the gathering, reviewing, and understanding of 
information about a given mission: the enemy, troops, terrain and time 
available. Course-of-action development produces three to five feasible, 
acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete course-of-actions. COA 
analysis is done to gain a deeper understanding of the consequence, and to 
improve the course-of-action’s structure through war-gaming. The course-of-
actions are evaluated against a set of commander's evaluation criteria through 
the formulation of COA analysis as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem. 
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3. Course-of-Action Simulation Analysis (CASA) 
Scientists at Ohio State University performed a course-of-action 
simulation analysis for the U.S. Army [50]. Hanna et al., emphasize that future 
U.S. military planning processes will “depend upon analysis systems to 
anticipate and respond in real-time to a dynamically changing battle space 
with counteractions.” Their research areas include: building a simulation test 
bed, a scalable, flexible simulation framework, automated scenario generation 
techniques with dynamic updating, intelligent adversarial behavior modeling, 
effects-based/attrition-based behavior modeling, and real-time analysis for 
comparing and grading the effectiveness of alternative simulations. They 
emphasize that modeling and simulation (M&S) technologies can assist the 
planning and decision-making chain with COA development and COA 
effectiveness prediction. 
Course-of-action simulation analysis covers a large number of course- 
of-actions, ranks them based on suitability and predicted results, and then 
down selects to the preferred approach. Genetic algorithms were used to 
create a large number of COA permutations from subject-matter-expert-
defined initial conditions and constraints. The large set of course-of-actions is 
then reduced to a set of pareto-optimal course-of-actions containing unique 
COA characteristics. The authors also point out that “the best COA may not 
be the one with the highest score. Rather, a COA that scores high against 
many eCOAs rather than a highest score against an expected eCOA may be 
the more prudent choice.” 
4. Recognition-Primed Decision Agent (RPDAgent) [38] 
The recognition-primed decision agent was developed based on Klein’s 
recognition-primed decision (RPD) making concepts to model a military 
decision-maker at the operational level of warfare [51]. A person’s decision-
making ability depends on his ability to recognize a particular decision 
situation and to identify an appropriate action based on past experience.  
Sokolowski uses the frame data structure that corresponds to a single 
experience that holds the cues, goals, and actions that describe that 
experience. In each decision situation, the RPDAgent searches its table of 
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frames to look for a match. If a match is found, the matching frame, together 
with its associated cues, goals, and actions will be retrieved. Otherwise, the 
model will ignore the situation. Upon recognizing a matching frame, the 
RPDAgent develops an internal representation of the decision situation, 
similar to the way humans develop an internal interpretation of their external 
environment based on experience.  
Environmental variables that describe the decision situation’s external 
environment are aggregated into cues, which are higher-level abstractions, to 
represent its internal interpretation of lower-level environmental variables that 
describe physical or mental parameters. Examples of location cues are beach 
topography, beach hydrography, water obstruction, staging area, etc. 
Examples of environmental variables for the beach topography are steepness, 
sand type, and obstacles. The environmental variables are assigned numeric 
values. The cue value is calculated by summing up the associated 
environmental variables and then converted into a fuzzy set, of which the 
shape and range define experience within the RPDAgent. One Decision 
Agent is provided for each active decision that uses the internal 
representation of the situation and encoded experience to choose the 
potential decision that appears most favorable [52]. Each action represents 
either a past or a current decision option that is characterized by 
environmental variables. The satisfaction of an action is computed by 
summing the cue values for each action. The action with the largest action 
value is considered the most favorable. It is also converted into a fuzzy value 
to serve as an intuitive indicator of the most favorable action.  
The Decision Agent subsequently instantiates one Reactive Agent for 
each goal under consideration [52]. The most favorable action is processed to 
determine how well it meets the goals of the situation based on experience. 
This is analogous to running mental simulation to determine if the selected 
action satisfies the current situation. A set of cues are used as indicators of 
the satisfactory of a goal. Goals are also associated with fuzzy sets that 
define how well a goal is being satisfied. If one or more goals are 
unsatisfactory, a negotiation process is carried out to derive a compromise. 
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The reactive agent for each goal will try to negotiate a compromise by 
lowering the standards of its goals. Negotiation is implemented by mapping 
the previously calculated goal value to a revised goal value through a 
multiplication factor that represents the tolerance of the risk. Subsequently, a 
compromise is reached if all goal values are satisfactory. If all goals are 
satisfied, the action under evaluation is selected. Otherwise, negotiation is 
carried out for the next most favorable action. If no satisfactory action can be 
found, a default decision is selected. 
5. Operational-Level Naval Planning Using Agent-Based 
Simulation 
In his thesis, Ercetin [53] noted that a plan must have the following 
characteristics: relevance, clarity, timeliness, flexibility, participation, economy 
of resources, security, and coordination. The planning process is depicted in 
Figure 6. In a commander’s estimate, the decision maker analyzes the 
situation, evaluates the threat, and perceives the mission. The subordinate 
commanders prepare a detailed plan including such aspects as allocation, 
deployment, and employment of forces in the operational areas. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Military Planning Logic (From [47]) 
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Ercetin mentions two broad categories of planning: force planning and 
operational planning. Force planning is done to build up capabilities, while 
operation planning is the allocation and movement of forces. His thesis 
focuses on operational planning. In the thesis, commander agents were used 
for force allocation, force deployment, and force movement. The commander 
was characterized by ten attributes: intelligence capability, speed preference, 
staying power preference, surface platform usage tendency, sub-surface 
platform usage tendency, air platform usage tendency, aggressiveness, 
budget, platforms, and attribute considerations. He named three goal types: 
allocation, deployment, and movement; and seven allocation goals for seven 
types of ships, three deployment goals for three different theatres, and two 
movement goals for stay or transit.  
6. Air and Surface Threat Assessment 
In his thesis, Ozkan [31] implements a threat assessment model, using 
a multi-agent system and conceptual blending theory, to mimic how a human 
expert assesses the intention of an incoming air threat. The thesis shows that 
a multi-agent system and conceptual blending theory can be used to 
introduce cognitive intelligence into a computational model. In another thesis, 
Tan [25] also implements threat assessment for surface warfare based on 
such cues as platform type, position, flag, destination, heading, speed, 
communication, activity, origin, and ESM to establish various forms of 
violations. The violations are: the security zone, area to be avoided, speed 
threshold, speed violation, location, and traffic heading. The violations are 
used to determine the track’s intention through a weighting strategy in terms 
of “friendly,” “neutral,” “potentially hostile,” or “unknown.” The results have 
been quite well received by the naval officers surveyed.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Although considerable work has been done in the area of plan 
generation, none has been done using conceptual blending theory (CBT). 
Software blending can be implemented using the suite of bio-inspired 
operators available in the CMAS library. The human-expert mental process 
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can be modeled using Boyd’s OODA loop theory, while Klein’s recognition-
primed decision approach can be used to model the myriad details in the 
OODA mental process. The probability of each attack tactic can be modeled 
using probability estimates, updated through a process of threat assessment 
and inductive reasoning. Finally, discrete event simulation and Simkit can be 
used to implement a simulator to demonstrate the utility of the plan generator.  
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III. DESIGN OF A PLAN GENERATOR FOR MARITIME 
INTERDICTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter described the theories on which the design of a 
plan generator for maritime interdiction might be based. Given the work done 
in the area of plan generation already described, plan generation is a heavily 
researched area for either providing decision support tools to aid human 
beings or to enhance the artificial intelligence of a non-player character in 
computer games or simulation systems. Nevertheless, plan generation using 
a conceptual blending theory is a novel application that is based on the way 
experienced operators rationalize a situational picture and course-of-actions 
are developed. This chapter will describe the design of a plan generator 
based on conceptual blending theory and the process of hypothesis 
generation, goal analysis, course-of-action formulation, analysis, and 
selection.  
B. MENTAL PROCESS 
The mental processes of observing a composite situational display, 
deriving a contact course-of-action hypothesis, and evaluating and selecting a 
course-of-action can be based on Boyd’s OODA cycle [13]. The objective of 
each of the mental processes that a surface warfare operator might use to 
plan for maritime interdiction is summarized in Table 1.  
Observation To collect data concerning all contacts, High Value Units and 
Interdiction Resources 
Orientation To infer course-of-action for each contact 
Decision To analyze the required Goal to counter the contact course-of-
action 
To develop all possible course-of-actions that satisfy the goals 
identified 
To evaluate and choose a set of course-of-actions.  
Action To monitor the development of the situation during decision 
execution.  
Table 1. Objective in Each Mental Process 
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1. Observation 
The operator observes each of the contacts displayed in the situational 
display. The display can be a fusion of a radar plot with other sensory sources 
such as the Automatic Shipboard Identification System, electronics 
intelligence, and other spot reports. Essentially, the four kinds of information 
available for further processing are kinematics and descriptive information 
(Table 2), intelligence information (Table 3), and visual observation (Table 4).   
 
Data element States Description 
MMSI number Unique ID unique reference identification 
Navigation status At anchor 
Underway 
Not under command 
 
Position x and y Cartesian coordinate system in 
x and y 
Heading 0 – 360deg The heading of the contact 




A contact can be coming from 
the southern Indonesia island, 
northern Malaysia peninsula, 
or the sea lines of 
communication.  
Craft Size Small 
Big 
This is the size of the contact. 
Small refers to small craft such 
as pleasure craft, tug boats, 
and fishing vessels. Big refers 
to large container and tanker 
ships 





A particular contact can be in 
either one of these five states. 
The states represent the 
human’s understanding of the 
contact based on a spot report 
or investigation by the patrol 
craft. 
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Data element States Description 
Engagement State Not Engaged 
In Process 
Neutralized 
This state indicates the 
engagement status of a 
contact. It can be not engaged, 
currently in the process of 
being engaged, or have been 
neutralized.  
Table 2. Contact Kinematics and Descriptive Information 
Data element States Description 
AIS Error True / false This element indicate whether 
there has been an Automatic 
Identification System error 





This state is based on the 
transmission coming from the 
shipboard radar or fire control 
radar. Each ship should have a 






This state is based on the 
interception of radio conversation 
of a contact ship with another 
party. The states are either 





This state is based on a suspicious 
conversation with the contact. 
 
Table 3. Contact Intelligence Information 
Data element States Description 
Crew Size Normal 
Too few 
Too many 
This state represents the crew size 
either observable or reported on 
board the contact.  
Crew Behavior Normal 
Abnormal 
The behavior of the crew can be 
either normal or abnormal. 
Small Arms Sighted True / false This aspect indicates whether 
small arms such as knifes or pistol 
have been sighted onboard the 
contact 
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Data element States Description 
RPG Sighted True / false This aspect indicates whether 
rocket-propelled grenade launchers 
have been sighted on board the 
contact. 
Missile Equipment True / false This aspect indicates whether 
missile-related equipment has 
been sighted on board the contact. 
Examples are: electro-optics 
sensors or fire control radar that 
can be used to guide missiles.  
Missile Canisters True / false This aspect indicates whether 
missile canisters have been 
sighted on board the contact.  
Flammable Cargo True / false This aspect indicates whether the 
contact is carrying flammable 
cargo. 
Overloaded True / false This aspect indicates whether the 
contact is heavily laden. 
Table 4. Contact Visual Information 
2. Orientation 
The operator uses information such as kinematics to infer a hypothesis 
for each contact. To identify hostile intention, contact course-of-action 
hypotheses can be derived for each contact against each possible high-value 
unit. Several hypotheses will be assigned to each contact and high-value-unit 
pair to represent several possible attack tactics. A “neutral intention” can be 
added to the list of attack tactics to compete for the likely intent. The 
probability of each of these attack tactics can be increased or decreased 
based on a set of incoming cues from the observation. This is the same 
method used by the expert in an air and surface warfare threat assessment 
[28].   
The likely situation, which is represented by the contact’s course-of-
action attack probability, can be “recognized” through the interpretation of the 
cues in the same way that an expert interprets cues to recognize a particular 
situation. This is similar to the recognition approach proposed by Klein [40]. 
However, instead of a serial recognition approach, multiple agents can be 
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used whereby each agent processes serial recognition in parallel to improve 
efficiency and to reduce the complexity involved in the second variability of 
the RPD model [40]. The second variability suggests that when the human 
expert acts based on the first situation that has satisfied all conditions without 
comparing it with other options, it is possible that when he receives new 
information of new events, he will discover that the first situation has been 
wrongly recognized. Klein explains that the serial approach with satisfying is 
more efficient, while the comparative approach is more difficult, although 
desirable, in classical decision theory [33]. Henceforth, to derive the most 
probable situation, multiple agents can be introduced to process serial 
recognition in parallel for eventual comparison.   
The attack tactics are based on the findings of Rohan [54], [55], 
Raymond [5], [56], and Bateman et al., [14] Six attack tactics have been 
identified (Table 5): suicide bombing; short-range weapon attack; boarding; 
suicide attack using huge container ship; suicide attack using tanker ship; and 
missile attack. Neutral is added to provide a possibility that the ship has a 
neutral intention.  
 
S/n Attack Tactics Description 
T1 Suicide Bombing 
Attack 
This tactic attempts to detonate explosives on 
board a small craft as the small craft makes 
contact with the target.  
T2 Short-Range 
Weapon Attack 
This tactic attempts to launch a short-range 
weapon such as a rocket-propelled grenade.  
T3 Boarding Attack This tactic attempts to board the target ship. 
T4 Container Ship 
Attack 
This tactic attempts to crash a huge tanker ship 
into the target.  
T5 Tanker Ship Attack This tactic attempts to crash a ship that carries 
flammable cargo into the target.  
T6 Missile Attack This tactic attempts to launch a missile against 
the target.  
T7 Neutral This is not an attack tactic but represents a 
neutral shipping intention. 
Table 5. Attack Tactics 
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The experience is encoded using an approach similar to the one used 
by Liebhaber and Feher [28]. Each of the cues is processed against each of 
the attack tactics by either increasing or decreasing the probability. An 
example of how a cue will be processed by the seven attack tactics is given in 
Table 6. 
 
Cue State T1 T1 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 
< 0.5nm +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ --- --- 
0.5 to 1nm + +++ + + + --- - 
1nm to 5nm - + - - - ++ + 
5nm to 10nm -- -- -- -- -- +++ ++ 
Proximity 
> 10nm --- --- --- --- --- - +++ 
Table 6. Example of How Experience Can Be Coded 
A survey of the interpretation of the cues with regard to the attack 
tickets has been conducted with several experienced naval warfare officers. 
The survey format is similar to that of Liebhaber and Feher [28]. However, 
during the first few interviews, the naval officers agreed that it is difficult to 
assess an individual cue in isolation. Certain cues are only meaningful when 
evaluated with another cue. For example, proximity and heading by itself is 
meaningless. A heading that is directed at a high-value unit is not threatening 
if it is far away. The enhanced survey format with grouping of cues is 
described in Appendix A. The experiences gathered are summarized in 
Appendix B.  
Each ticket is then able to produce a probability estimate independently 
based on its autonomous interpretation of each cue. Such local behavior can 
then produce a global pattern that infers a particular attack tactic. The attack 
tactic can then be deduced using an inductive approach [35] through pattern 
recognition. The probability estimate patterns can be found in Figures 43, 44, 
45, 46, 47, and 48.  
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Mental simulation can then be conducted for each hypothesis to 
simulate into the future to compute the counter-factor information of the 
attack. For example, with the velocity vector of both the contact and the high-
value unit, we can compute into the future the possible collision time and 
space. This is called “running the blend” in cognitive blending theory. After the 
hypotheses have been established, the derived intention of the ship can be 
selected based on the hypothesis that carries the highest attack tactic 
probability. The computed attack probability becomes one of the attributes of 
the contact and becomes the vulnerability figure of the high-value unit. This is 
called “back-projection” in cognitive blending theory. The contact can now be 
prioritized according to its attack probability. 
3. Decision 
One course-of-action can be established for each interdiction facility 
and contact pair. Each course-of-action will then be evaluated based on the 
following factors: 
What must be done to counter the threat? 
What capability must be available to accomplish the task? 
How much time do we have? 
An effectiveness value for each course-of-action can then be derived. 
Then, a linear assignment can be done to select the optimal set of course-of-
action by using attack probability as the priority and effectiveness as the cost. 
This approach is contradictory to Klein’s suggestion in course-of-action 
derivation [40]. Klein found that a human expert does not use optimizing in 
choosing a course-of-action but bases it on a satisfying approach. This 
approach is efficient for a human being but is still not perfect as defined in the 
3rd variability. After deciding on the first course-of-action that satisfies all 
conditions, the human expert may discover a flaw in the course-of-action 
either by mental simulation or in the midst of executing the course-of-action. 
The optimizing approach is used here for three reasons. First, although Klein 
found that optimizing is difficult for human beings, he did not imply that 
optimization is a bad approach for a computational model. Second, the 
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course-of-action selection process fits a linear assignment problem frame 
work. The third reason is that, although Klein found that a serial approach is 
good for human operations, the computational model is capable of parallel 
processing.  
After the resource-to-contact assignments have been carried out, the 
course-of-actions selected are then evaluated against the goals derived 
based on the inferred contact course-of-action. If any of the goals cannot be 
fulfilled for an optimal solution, an external agency such as a helicopter will be 
scrambled for maritime interdiction.  
4. Action 
After the selection of the course-of-action, the interdiction resources 
will be deployed. The operator will continue to monitor the situation and to 
amend the plan if the situation changes. Changes to the plan must be done by 
repeating the OOAD mental process. 
C. THE CONCEPTUAL BLENDING NETWORK 
This section will provide a detailed description of the mental process. 
The overall blending network is shown in Figure 7. The blending network 
starts from the top. First, the Orientation Generic Space brings together one 
Contact Input Space, one High-Value Unit Input Space and one Attack Tactic 
Input Space to form one Contact Course-of-Action Hypothesis Blended 
Space. Then, the attack probability for the Hypothesis Blended Space will be 
computed through the completion process while the time of attack will be 
computed through the elaboration process. Some of the blended information 
is then projected back to the input spaces. Second, the Goal Generic Space 
brings together one Contact Input space and one Goal Input space to form 
one Goal Blended Space. Then, the goal required will be derived through the 
process of completion while the time of the goal to be achieved is computed 
through the process of elaboration. Third, the Resource Course-of-Action 
Generic Space will bring together one Goal Blended Space and One 
Resource Input Space to form one possible Course-of-Action Blended Space. 
The capability matching between the goal and the resource will be determined 
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through the process of completion while the effectiveness and time of 
achieving the goal will be computed through the process of elaboration. The 
final process involves the Decision Generic Space bringing in all possible 
Course-of-Action Blended Spaces and all Contact Input Spaces. It will 
prioritize the input space and linearly assign resources to contacts. For 
example, resources might refer to several number of patrol craft with different 
capabilities while contact might refer to suspicious ships. The detailed 


































































Figure 7.   Overall Blending Network 
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1. Observation  
One reactive agent is created for each contact to monitor that contact 
in the contact input space. The contact reactive agents do not keep any state 
information or process any information. They simply update each of the 
monitor states in accordance with the changes in the real-world environment.  
Agents with very simple internal states a little or no internal model of their 
environment are frequently referred to as “reactive agents” [27]. The contact 
reactive agents are created as Track Data Tickets as shown in Figure 8. The 
data elements are data that are translated from the real world. The lines with 
different shapes attached to each element are connectors that can be 
extended or retracted in the membrane. When a particular data element is 
available, the associated connector will be extended. Certain data elements 
will always be extended, such as track ID, sensed state, position, heading, 
and origin. These data elements are usually available from a maritime radar 
system. The other data elements may or may not be available depending on 
the incoming data stream from the real world. For example, the default 
condition of a ship is assumed not overloaded (i.e., not carrying an excessive 
load of cargo or fuel). However, if overloading is spotted, such a spot report 
will be translated by the contact data ticket and its associated connector will 
be extended.   
Certain data elements are not available from the real-world 
environment but are back-projected from other mental processes. Data 
elements such as attack probability, possible target, time to react, and derived 
sensed states are counterfactual, that is, these data are not a fact yet but are 
mainly a result of the blending process and mental simulation. These data are 
described in Table 7.  
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Figure 8.   Contact Data Ticket (the geometric shapes extending from the 
ticket represent a variety of connectors) 






















Time to React 
Derived Sensed State 
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Data element States Description 
Attacked Probability 0..1 This is a counterfactual indication of the 
contact probability to conduct a terrorist 
attack. 
Possible Target HVU ID This is a counterfactual indication of the 
HVU being a possible target of the 
contact. 
Time to React Sec This is a counterfactual indication of the 
time left to neutralize the contact before 
the contact will reach its intended 
target. 
Derived Sensed State Hostile 
Neutral 
These are the states that are derived 
through the analysis of the available 
data element by the multi-agent 
system.  
Table 7. Contact Data Elements from Inference 
Similarly, one reactive agent is created for each high-value unit (HVU) 
(Figure 9) and interdiction resource (Figure 10) to monitor the states of the 
HVU and interdiction resource in the real world, respectively. The description 























Figure 10.   Interdiction Resource Data Ticket 
Data element States Description 
Position x and y Cartesian coordinate system in x and y 
Heading 0 – 360deg The heading of the contact 
Speed 0 – 50knots Travel speed of the contact 
Cargo type Flammable  
Non Flammable 
To indicate if this is carrying flammable 
cargo  
Table 8. HVU Data Elements  
Data element States Description 
Position x and y Cartesian coordinate system in x and 
y 
Heading 0 – 360deg The heading of the contact 
Close Sensing 
Capability 
True / False Capability to make close observation  
Boarding Capability True / False Capability to board the ship 
Destroy Capability True / False Capability to Sink the contact 












Contact course-of-action deduction is carried out through the blending 
network as shown in Figure 11. It is done through a process of composition, 
completion, and elaboration. The overlapping of mental spaces symbolizes 
that there are multiple instances of the mental spaces.  
During the composition process, each of the generic spaces, which are 
seeded with a unique combination of HVU and attack tactics, will create a 
unique hypothesis blend for each new contact that has not been verified 
neutral. The contact, HVU, and attack tactics are connected through the vital 
link of predator-prey relationship. The predator (contact) can attack its prey 
(HVU) using one of the possible attack tactics. The resultant hypothesis blend 
represents one possible Contact Course-of-Action that is composed of one 
contact, one HVU, and one tactic. The hypothesis ticket is then released into 
the membrane for the elaboration process.  
The process of completion is done similar to Liebhaber and Feher’s 
[28] surface warfare threat assessment approach. The baseline of each attack 
tactic probability is first set to 0.5, representing that each new contact has a 
similar chance of being either hostile or neutral. After which, each of the 
attack ticket adjusts its probability value autonomously, based on a series of 
events that bring in pieces of information about the contact. These pieces of 
information are termed “cues” by Liebhaber and Feher [28]. This process 
resembles the way an expert conducts threat assessment by increasing or 
decreasing its threat probability based on a set of cues. The set of cues is 
listed in Table 10. Each tactic ticket has a goal to predict independently and 
accurately on the attack probability. An example is shown in Figure 12. In this 
case, the attack probability of an unknown contact, “BigShip2,” attacking 










Figure 11.   Contact Course-of-Action Deduction Blending Network 
The process of elaboration is carried out by taking each of the 
completed blends and projecting into the future to deduce counterfactual 
information such as the time of attack. This is similar to the way a human 
operator conducts mental simulation to determine possible future events. The 
time of attack will determine the time criticality of the threat.  
 
Cues States 
Proximity Types Far, Near, Very Near, Too Near 
Heading Types Pulling away, Approaching, Directing at 
Speeding True / False 
Origin Indonesia, Malaysia, SLOC 
Craft Size Small, Big 
AIS Discrepancy True / false 





True / false 
Crew Size Normal, Too few, Too many 
Crew Behavior Normal, Abnormal 
Small Arm Sighted True / false 
RPG Sighted True / false 
Missile Equipment True / false 
Missile Canister True / false 
Flammable Cargo True / false 
Overloaded True / false 
Table 10. Cues for Threat Assessment 
 
Figure 12.   Attack Ticket Predicts Attack Probability Independently 
After the blending process is completed, the contact course-of-action 
with the highest probability of attack will be chosen as the attack tactic. The 
attack probability, time to react, and the possible target are then back-
projected to the contact input space and become part of the input space 
attributes for use in the subsequent blending process, as shown in Table 10. 
Similarly, the attack probability against a particular ship will be back-projected 
to the HVU input space to serve as the HVU vulnerability attribute. The 
contacts can now be prioritized according to their attack probability as shown 
in Table 11.  
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Table 11. Prioritized Contact Input Space with Back-Projected Information 
3. Decision  
The decision-making mental process can be further organized into 
three sub-processes: Goal Analysis, Own Course-of-Action generation and 
Own Course-of-Action selection.  
After a contact course-of-action has been established, a human 
operator will analyze the situation to determine the Goal to counter each 
Contact Course-of-Action. Some of the situations and their associated Goals 
are given in Table 12. The blending network for Goal Analysis is as shown in 
Figure 13. During composition, the generic space guides the selective 
projection of elements connected through a cause-effect vital link to the new 
blend. The completion process then establishes the Goal required, based on 
the sensed state and attack probability. Finally, the elaboration process 
computes the time required for the Goal in order to counter the contact 
course-of-action. After the blending process is completed, the blended 
information (need and time required) are then back-projected into the Contact 
Input Space for subsequent processing.  
 
Sensed State and Induced attack probability Goal 
Unknown and low attack probability  To Investigate 
Unknown and high attack probability To Board 
Hostile To Board 
Table 12. Situation and Associated Needs 
After the Goals have been derived, the next mental process is to derive 
all possible Own Course-of-Actions (OCOA). In this context, one OCOA 
 47
means the assignment of one interdiction resource against one contact. If 
there are m contacts and n resources, there will be n x m possible OCOA. For 
example, if there are 1,000 contacts and 6 patrol crafts, there are a total of 









Figure 13.   Blending Network for Goals Analysis 
The blending network for generating own course-of-actions is given in 
Figure 14. The composition process generates an OCOA blend for each 
interdiction resource and contact pair. The completion process then 
determines if there has been a match in the Goal requirement and capability 
available. For example, if the Goal specifies a boarding requirement, the 
unmanned surface vessels, which contain no humans on board, have no 
capability to board another ship. In this example, there is no match between 
the Goal and capability. This means that the capability cannot be used to 
achieve the Goal. The unmatched OCOA will not be discarded at this stage 
just in case there is no other resource that has a capability to match the need. 
In such a situation, the Unmanned Surface Vessel will still be deployed to 
observe the high-prioritized contact. The elaboration process then computes 
the time required for the interdiction resource to reach the contact. The time to 
reach is computed as a function of the interdiction resource and contact 
velocity. The time to reach contact is the effectiveness value. If the mental 
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simulation concluded that the contact would reach its target before the 
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Figure 14.   Blending Network for Own Course-of-Action Generation 
The blending network for a decision on the course-of-action is as 
shown in Figure 15. The decision on the course-of-action is done by linear 
assignment using Munkras’ algorithm [57] with effectiveness as the cost. 
However, before the linear assignment is carried, the Contact Input Spaces 
must be sorted according to attack probability. After which, the n number of 
the highest attack probability contact are selected for the assignment process. 
The n is the number of available interdiction resources. After which, the initial 
list of possible OCOA is reduced by culling the course-of-actions that are not 
in the top-priority list. The effectiveness of the reduced course-of-actions list is 
then formulated into the cost matrix as input to Munkras’ algorithm. After the 
assignment process, if none of the interdictions are able to reach the contact 
in time before it reaches its hypothesized target, an emergency interdiction 




Get the top few contact with highest attack priority










Figure 15.   Blending Network for Own Course-of-action Decision 
4. Action  
After the assignment process, the course-of-actions are disseminated 
out to the interdiction resources for execution. The Observation-Orientation-
Decision-Action mental process is repeated immediately in order to allow 
continual assessment and dynamic reassignment should a higher priority 
threat appear.  
D. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the mental process of the plan generation guided by 
Boyd’s OODA loop theory has been described. It has been shown that the 
entire mental process can be meaningfully described using the novel 
conceptual blending theory. The blending process can then be implemented 
using the NPS’s proven software blending technologies made available in the 
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND TESTING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The first research question is to determine whether the conceptual 
blending theory [26] can be used to model an expert’s mental process to 
generate plans for maritime interdiction. The mental process is based on 
Boyd’s OODA loop theory [13]. The second research question is to determine 
whether the bio-inspired operator “ticket” can be used to deduce contact 
course-of-action [27]. The third research question is to determine whether 
software blending that is implemented using the Compounded Multi-Agent 
System (CMAS) library [27] can be used to support real-time plan generation. 
The output from the plan generation process has two by-products: Contact 
Course-of-Action (CCOA) analysis, and Interdiction Resources Course-of-
Action development (IRCOA).  
The design of Boyd’s OODA mental process using conceptual blending 
theory was described in the previous chapter. The use of a bio-inspired 
operator “ticket” was described. To test the hypotheses, the above-mentioned 
theories must be applied in a maritime interdiction environment. As this is just 
a concept demonstrator, integration with a live Vehicle Traffic Service System 
is not desirable. Henceforth, a simulator was used to simulate the shipping 
traffic, high-value units, and interdiction resources in the straits of Singapore.  
This chapter describes the simulator development and various tests 
carried out to determine the performance of the Plan Generation Software.  
B. SIMULATOR DEVELOPMENT 
Several simulators have been evaluated to provide input to test the 
Plan Generation Software. The Simkit-based simulator, developed and used 
for the NPS SEA Integrated Project for Port Security Strategy 2012 [29], was 
chosen because of our familiarity with Simkit and Java Programming 
language. Several modifications were made in order for the simulator to serve 




Contact Attributes In addition to the kinematic attributes of the ships, other 
attributes were added to provide additional inputs to 
simulate the data available from the Automatic 
Identification System, intelligence, and visual reports.  
Terrorist Behavior The behavior of terrorists has been enhanced to allow the 
user to choose from a set of available start positions and 
targets. The terrorists have the option of moving directly to 
the target or to follow the sea lane and turn toward the 
target at the Closest Point of Approach along the sea lane. 
The terrorist can also follow a ship to simulate a boarding 





Instead of following a scripted path, the interdiction 
resources were enhanced to take tasking instructions from 
the Plan Generation Software and conduct a pursuit 
operation against an assigned contact. The interdiction 
resource will chase the target until the target is neutralized, 
verified neutral, or reassigned to another interdiction 
resource. 
Display The map was also changed from the port of Oakland to the 
strait of Singapore. The icon colors were changed to reflect 
the state of the contact: unknown (yellow), neutral (light 
green), inferred neutral (dark green), inferred hostile 
(magenta), hostile (red), and neutralized (white). The 
display is shown in Figure 17.  
Table 13. Enhancement to Simulators 
 
Figure 16.   Terrorist Configuration Panel 
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Figure 17.   Adaptive Display of Situational Picture 
C. PLAN GENERATION SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
Before the Plan Generation Software can be run, it needs to be 
configured with the threat assessment experience. After the experience is 
configured, the Plan generation will take in contact information from the 
simulated Vessel Traffic Service System, High Value Unit Monitoring System, 
and Interdiction Resources from the simulator to generate the plan. The plan 
is expressed in terms of Interdiction Resource to Contact Assignment. The 
inferred Contact Course-of-Action can then be used for adaptive display 
purposes. The system architecture is shown in Figure 18.  
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Figure 18.   Plan Generation Software Architecture 
The threat assessment experience was compiled from a group of Naval 
Surface Warfare Officers from Singapore and the U.S. Navy through a survey. 
The survey was conducted to understand how experienced surface warfare 
officers conduct threat assessment based on a set of cues. This is the same 
approach used by Liebhaber and Feher [28] to capture threat assessment 
experience from experts in air and surface warfare domains.  
The mental spaces are displayed in the form of a table in the Plan 
Generation Software as shown in Figures 19 through 26. The display of 
mental spaces will allow the operator to look at the mental spaces to 
determine how the plans are generated. Figures 19 and 20 display the 
Contact Input Space. The attributes in Figure 19 come mainly from AIS, visual 
observation, and intelligence systems, while Figure 20 describes the 
kinematic attributes and information that are back-projected from the blending 
process. The back-projected attributes are Attack Probability, Possible Target, 
Time of Strike, and Distance to Target. Note that the threat input spaces are 
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Figure 19.   Contact Cues Set 1 
 
Figure 20.   Contact Cues Set 2 
The high-value unit (HVU) input space is shown in Figure 21. The 
attributes of vulnerability and possible threat are back-projected attributes 
from the blending process, indicating the vulnerability of this HVU, which is 
prone to terrorist attack, and the possible hostile ship. Note that the 
vulnerability attribute is the same as the attack probability of the possible ship. 
The attack probability of 0.9 means that the HVU is 90 percent vulnerable and 
subjected to be strike.  
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Figure 21.   HVU Input Space 
The hypothesis blended space is shown in Figure 22. The hypothesis 
blended space lists out all possible targets and tactics that a particular contact 
might strike. The probability of attack is computed based on the threat 
assessment model described earlier during our descriptions of the completion 
process. The available time indicates the time duration before the contact will 
hit the target.  
 
 
Figure 22.   Hypothesis Blended Space 
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The probability estimates pattern for attack tactics in each contact and 
HVU pair is shown in Figure 23, which describes a case in which the attack 
probability for BigShip 2 against Mobile HVU3 is pretty low.  
 
 
Figure 23.   Hypothesis Blended Space 
The goal generated for each contact is shown in Figure 24. The goal is 
determined based on the sensed state and the inferred attack probability. If 
the inferred sensed state is hostile, the goal is to stop the ship. Otherwise, the 
goal is to investigate the ship for positive identification.  
 
 
Figure 24.   Goal Generation 
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The possible course-of-actions for each interdiction resource are 
shown in Figure 25. Each resource-to-contact pair is a possible course-of-
action. Each course-of-action is evaluated based on an effectiveness 
attribute, which is determined by the time for the resource to get to the contact 
as well as goal satisfaction by the resources. After the evaluation of all 
possible course-of-actions, the decision is made by considering the number of 
resources available and the prioritized contact through a linear assignment 
process. The decision on the course-of-action is as shown in Figure 26.  
 
 
Figure 25.   Course-of-Actions 
 
Figure 26.   Decision 
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D. VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
The verification and validation strategy is based on the 
recommendations provided by Sargent [59]. The simulator and Plan 
Generation Software were presented to several experienced littoral water 
surface warfare officers and command and control engineers. The survey 
form and the survey results are given in Appendix C and Appendix D 
respectively. They were first presented with a cluttered scenario as shown in 
Figure 27. Within the scenario, there are four unmanned surface vessels, two 
patrol craft, and nine mobile and static high-value units. The yellow icons 
symbolize “unknown.” They were then asked to describe how a human 
operator would conduct situational assessment and plan for maritime 
interdiction. After which, the plan generation was executed and the adaptive 
display was shown to them as in Figure 28. The darker green color icons 
symbolize “inferred neutral” while the moron color represents “inferred 
hostile.”  
 
Figure 27.   Cluttered Environment along Singapore Straits.  
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Figure 28.   Situational Awareness Display 
The pattern that resembles a suicide bombing attack is shown in Figure 
29. The pattern that resembles a short-range weapon attack is shown in 
Figure 30. The pattern that resembles a boarding attack is shown in Figure 
31. The pattern that resembles a huge mass attack is shown in Figure 32. The 
pattern that resembles a high-energy attack is shown in Figure 33. The 
pattern that resembles a missile attack is shown in Figure 34. 
 
Figure 29.   Suicide Bombing Probability Estimates Pattern 
 
Figure 30.   Short-Range Weapon Attack Probability Estimates Pattern 
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Figure 31.   Boarding Attack Probability Estimates Pattern 
 
Figure 32.   Huge Mass Attack Probability Estimates Pattern 
 
Figure 33.   High-Energy Attack Probability Estimates Pattern 
 
Figure 34.   Missile Attack Probability Estimates Pattern 
The conceptual model validity was carried out by using the common 
military decision-making conceptual model described by Boyd’s OODA Loop 
Theory [23]. The interviewees indicated that Boyd’s conceptual model 
resembles the way they make decisions in a littoral surface warfare context. 
Computerized model verification was carried out by looking at reactive agents’ 
attributes and determining the mental spaces computed through the graphical 
user interface. For example, with eight high-value units and a hundred (100) 
contacts, there were eight hundred (800) hypotheses created and evaluated. 
Operational validity was carried out by asking whether the mental pattern of 
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the computed Attack Probability Estimates resembles that of an experienced 
surface warfare officer. The interviewees indicated that the computed mental 
pattern does resemble that of an expert. Data validity was carried out by 
interviewing several experienced littoral water warfare officers and by de-
conflicting some of the data collected. Although experts may process cues 
differently, the differences were presented to ask for their second opinions 
and allow them to adjust their opinions.  
Some of the techniques used in the verification and validation 
processes were Animation, Degenerate Tests, Extreme Condition Tests, Face 
Validity, Fixed Values, Internal Validity, and Turing Tests. The simulator 
provides the animation. The kinematics of each contact can be observed in 
the animation while the decision made by the plan generation software can 
also be observed through the approach taken by the interdiction resources. 
One example is that of a terrorist ship approaching one high-value unit from 
afar. The attack probability constantly adjusts itself as the terrorist approaches 
the high-value unit.  
Degenerate Tests were used to determine if the plan generator 
software would produce the expected attack probability given a set of contact 
attributes as shown in Figures 29 through 34. Extreme Condition Tests were 
carried out by using the extremes of both contact data attributes available. For 
example, in some cases, only kinematics and AIS information were available, 
while in other cases, visual information was available through spot reports. 
For Face Validity, the interviewees were asked to observe the entire mental 
process calculated and to determine whether the process resembles that of 
an expert. In the Fixed Values test, the speed and capability of interdiction 
resources were changed to analyze the effect on the effectiveness 
computation and decision-making processes. Internal Validity was used to 
see if the plan generation software generates a similar set of results with a 
similar set of cues. Turing Tests was conducted by asking the interviewees to 
see if they could tell whether the decisions were computed by the plan 
generation software or a human expert.  
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The interviewees agreed that the above Probability Estimates Patterns 
describe a possible means to represent an expert’s mental pattern in a 
situational recognition process. For example, Figure 35 can represent a 
mental pattern in which, although a short-range weapon attack pattern is high, 
the other form of attacks, such as suicide bombing and boarding, are also 
possible. According to the survey results, the Navy officers and engineers 
indicated that the threat analysis resembles how an expert would conduct 
surface warfare threat assessment. Although they agreed that human 
operators would be able to do the job, the task of monitoring a cluttered 
environment would be greatly enhanced by such a decision support tool. As 
for planning of own course-of-actions, most interviewees expressed that an 
optimal planning system such as this Plan Generation Software based on 
threat intention and effectiveness would be very beneficial as a decision 
support tool.  
E. BEYOND EXPERIENCE HANDLING 
The above probability estimate patterns describe a typical situational 
pattern. However, the real-world environment may present an atypical set of 
cues that might be either contradictory or ambiguous. Under such 
circumstances, Klein [40] writes that the human expert is able to recognize the 
threat and act accordingly.  
The probability estimate pattern is also able to represent such an 
atypical pattern, for example, the pattern for a bombing attack as shown in 
Figure 29. When conducting suicide bombing, suppose that the terrorist 
usually does not carry a weapon but only bombs. However, should an atypical 
pattern exist in which a suicide attacker does carry a weapon; the 
corresponding pattern is as described in Figure 35. Comparing this pattern 
with the typical pattern shown in Figure 29, the atypical pattern suggests that 
both short-range and suicide bombing attacks are equally possible. A 
boarding attack, however, is low probability because of other factors such as 
not enough manpower to board a ship.  
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Figure 35.   Missile Attack Probability Estimates Pattern 
F. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
Several types of tests are conducted to test the performance and 
usefulness of the Plan Generation Software: 
a.  Comparison of the performance with and without the plan 
generation software.  
b.  Comparison of the performance with and without a threat 
assessment Plan Generation  
c.  Computation Time Analysis.  
1. Comparison of Performance with and without the Plan 
Generation Software 
Without the plan generation software, the patrol profile of each 
interdiction resource might be preplanned or scripted. The patrol profile of 
each interdiction resource is as shown in Figure 36.  
 
Figure 36.   Scripted Interdiction Patrol Profile 
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For the scenario with the plan generation software, the interdiction 
resources are stationed at their respective positions as marked by the blue 
and Cyan squares as shown in Figure 37. The dark green represents an 
inferred neutral while the light green represents a verified neutral. The maroon 
color represents an inferred hostile. In this scenario, there are a total of a 
hundred (100) neutral ships and ten (10) terrorists.  
 
 
Figure 37.   Scenario to Test Plan Generation Software 
In both test cases, ten terrorists were launched from three positions 
(west, south, and east) to attack five high-value unit installations. The 
measure of effectiveness (MOE) is based on the percentage of terrorists 
neutralized and the percentage of neutral shipping identified as neutral. The 




unable to model pursuit and different capabilities of interdiction, the level of 
details has been simplified to allow instant terrorist suppression and USV 
boarding capability. The results are shown in Figure 38.  
 





























Figure 38.   Comparison of Planned Profile with Scripted Profile 
From Figure 38, the planned profile by the Plan Generation Software 
was able to neutralize most of the terrorists while the scripted profile was only 
able to neutralize around 60 percent of the terrorists by chance. The scripted 
profile was able to investigate more neutral ships, because the scripted 
profiles are in the midst of the shipping traffic. The planned profile investigated 
fewer neutral ships because more emphasis was being placed on high-priority 
threats, which resulted in its investigating ships that were farther away. The 
lesser number of neutral ships being investigated may not imply lower 
performance, but rather higher efficiency without unnecessary investigation 
and yet an ability to achieve a higher terrorist interception rate.   
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2. Comparison of Performance with and without the Plan 
Generation Software 
The objective of this comparison is to highlight the importance of threat 
assessment before the planning process. Without threat assessment, the Plan 
Generation software simply uses range in the cost matrix for linear 
assignment without regarding the threat level. As a result, only around 50 
percent of the terrorists were neutralized, as is shown in Figure 39.  
 
Box Plot Comparison of Planning With and Without 


































































Figure 39.   Comparison of Planned Profile with and without Threat 
Assessment 
3. Computation Time Analysis 
The times required to compute the contact course-of-action and to 
make a decision on own course-of-action are given in Figure 40. The timings 
collected were based on running the software on a Dell Inspiron Notebook 
with 1.67 MHz CPU and 1GB RAM. The time requirement increases almost 
linearly with an increase in the number of ships. Henceforth, the time required 
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to compute one plan for one thousand ships in the Singapore Strait at any one 
time will take under two minutes. Since 60,000 ships transit through the 
Singapore Strait yearly [1], the ship time of arrival is approximately eight (8) 
minutes. As can be seen, the running of the plan for every ship arrival is 
feasible even on a low-end notebook. Therefore, the plan generation software 
is able to support near real-time planning for maritime interdiction.  
 
















































Time For CCOA Analysis
(sec)




Figure 40.   Computational Time for Plan Generation 
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has briefly described the enhancement of the simulator 
used in the SEA project. The architecture of the Plan Generation Software 
and several tests and surveys were also described. The tests show that the 
plan generated will allow a more effective and efficient deployment of 
interdiction resources. The amount of time required to generate the plan is 
able to support a near real-time application in the busy Singapore straits. 
Experienced naval officers and C2 engineers also verified that the threat 
assessment process resembles the mental processes that a human expert 
would use in the conduct of threat assessment. The chapter also shows that 
the probability estimate pattern can be used to represent a human mental 
pattern and can even be used to represent an atypical situation.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
This thesis shows that it is possible for the Boyd’s OODA mental 
process [23], using conceptual blending theory [26], to develop course-of-
action for maritime interdiction resources. The conceptual blending theory was 
implemented using the NPS CMAS Library [27] and a multi-agent system to 
model a human expert in the process of contact course-of-action 
identification.   
The threat assessment model was developed based on Surface 
Warfare Threat Assessment [28]. During the model development process with 
expert surface warfare officers, we discovered that experts do not evaluate 
cues in isolation. A bio-inspired operator was used in the cue interpretation 
process. The thesis shows that the threat assessment model resembles the 
process of a human operator conducting surface threat assessment.  
In addition, it shows that a group of probability estimates can be used 
to model the human mental pattern in a threat evaluation process. An 
individual probability estimate process autonomously based on local cue data 
can produce a global effect that induces the threat reasoning process.  
It shows that a group of interdiction resources can be managed better 
with this Plan Generation Software as compared to a fixed path or nearest 
target approach. The performance of the plan allows the interception of 
terrorists with a high success rate without having the need to inspect more 
ships.  
It has also been shown that a huge amount of contact course-of-action 
and own course-of-action can be generated through the conceptual blending 
theory process. Both sets of course-of-actions were evaluated through the 
use of conceptual blending to make a decision based on contact and 
interdiction resource analysis.  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis was an academic exercise that aimed to develop a concept 
demonstrator based on the conceptual blending theory to model an expert 
mental process through the OODA loop theory. Although the thesis 
demonstrated some success in applying the concept described in chapter two 
and has been well received by experienced naval officers and engineers, the 
factors of consideration are by no means comprehensive if this system is to 
be deployed in a real-world environment. A more detailed study based on 
available cues and classification of cues should be conducted. In addition, the 
process of goals generation and decision making can be improved by 
including goals such as logistical consideration, area of coverage influence, 
and environmental conditions. Logistical considerations may include the fuel 
and labor costs. Area of coverage refers to a consideration that all high-value 
units should be within the close proximity of one of the interdiction resources 
for deterrence and protection. Environmental conditions include the sea state 
and weather conditions.  
In addition, the contact course-of-action analysis could be improved by 
Introducing mental simulation using intelligence agents to represent the 
terrorists. The terrorist behavior could be modeled as a function of interdiction 
resource positioning and environmental and traffic conditions before launching 
an operation. Ng [58] successfully applied intelligence agent technology to 
allow maritime terrorists to be adaptive to the environment and appear 
cognitively intelligent. His thesis features intelligence path-finding as a 
function of threat analysis. Such intelligent maritime terrorists allow the 
simulation into the enemy OODA mental loop process as suggested by Boyd 
[13]. That simulation might require a significance amount of computing power 
to allow real-time application.  
Another enhancement might include learning agents to manage the 
interpretation of the cues in the threat assessment instead of a simple 
application of an expert’s knowledge. After a prediction, each tactic agent 
could compare its prediction to the actual results after positive identification so  
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that adjustments could be made to improve the cue interpretation process. 
This would allow the system to accumulate its own experiences in addition to 
the expert’s experience.  
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THREAT ASSESSMENT 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine how experienced surface 
warfare personnel conduct surface threat assessment based on a given set of 
cues. 
 
Given the following cues, how will each state of cues affect your assessment 
of the attack probability of a contact against a high value unit? Please 
evaluate each state against each attack tactics by indicating: 
 
− ‘+’  Increase likelihood little 
− ‘++’  Increase likelihood more 
− ‘-‘  Decrease likelihood little 
− ‘-‘  Decrease likelihood more 










Name (optional): __________________ 
 
E-mail (optional): __________________ 
 
Number of years of Surface Warfare experience: _________ 
Contac
t
High Value Unit 
? 
What are the possible intentions of this contact against this high value 
unit? 
- Attempt to conduct Suicide Bombing? 
- Attempt to launch a RPG? 
- Attempt to Board? 
- Attempt leverage on its high inertial energy to cause 
damages?  






  Too near (<0.2nm) Very near (0.2nm – 1nm) Near (1nm – 10nm) Far (> 10nm) 


























































            
T7 Neutral 
Intention 

























































                 
T7 Normal                  
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Sn Attack Tactics Cues 
  Craft Size Speed Origin AIS ELINT HVU Type HVU Type 
  Small Big yes no Southern 
island 
SLOC Error Normal Nav 
Radar 








              
T2 Short Range 
Weapon Attack 
Against HVU 










              




              
T6 Missile Attack 
Against HVU 
              
T7 Normal               
 
 77




  Too near (<0.2nm) Very near (0.2nm – 1nm) Near (1nm – 10nm) Far (> 10nm) 
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Sn Attack Tactics Cues 
  Craft Size Speed Origin AIS ELINT HVU Type HVU Type 
  Small Big yes no Southern 
island 
SLOC Error Normal Nav 
Radar 








+ - + O + O + O O - O O O O 
T2 Short Range 
Weapon Attack 
Against HVU 










- + + O + O + O O - O O + - 




- + + O + O + O O - O O + + 
T6 Missile Attack 
Against HVU 
- + - O + O + O O ++ O O O O 
T7 Normal O O - O O O - + + -- O O O O 
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APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR VERIFYING THE PLAN 





The purpose of this questionnaire is to verify the plan generation 
models developed in the thesis on a multi-agent system (MAS) for planning 
the deployment of maritime interdiction asset to conduct close surveillance 
and interdiction mission along a busy sea lane. The plan generation process 
include the processes of unfriendly course of action identification, need 
identification, patrol craft effectiveness assessment and patrol craft to track 
assignment.  
 
In order to achieve this goal, the MAS has three main objectives: 
 
1. To help the human operator monitor high volume traffic conditions in 
the port and surrounding waterways in order to identify suspicious 
shipping and associated course of action.  
 
2. To help the human operator to focus on the higher priority track 
through adaptive display of the situational picture and track 
prioritization.   
 
3. To help the human operator to generate assignment plan for the 
maritime interdiction asset in order to conduct close surveillance or 
interdiction mission.   
 
The thesis is only a preliminary investigation into the modeling of plan 
generation of maritime interdiction process. The models are not considered 
exhaustive as they only use a very small and basic set of parameters and 
attributes. It is expected that there will be many more parameters that may be 
used by human experts in determining and analyzing of the hypothesis 
generated.  
 
The focus of this validation will only be on the hypothesis and plan generation 









Name (optional): __________________ 
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E-mail (optional): __________________ 
 
Number of years of Surface Warfare experience: _________ 
 
Number of years in C2 system development: (For contractor): ___________ 
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1  Do you use observation-orientation-
decision-action loop theory as your mental 
process in making decision in a combat 
environment? 
 
Yes Not Sure No 
2  Does the mental picture formed by the 
computer resemble the mental picture 
formed by human expert? 
 
Similar Not Sure Different
3 Does the computer produce meaningful 
attack hypothesis mental picture with the 
given cues? 
 
Yes Not Sure No 
4 How does the computer perform in 
identifying terrorist activities? 
 
Good Not Sure Bad 
5 How does the computer perform in own 
course-of-action analysis? 
 
Good Not Sure Bad 
6 How does the computer perform in 
deciding own course-of-action? 
 
Good Not Sure Bad 
7 Will such a system be useful to assist the 
human expert in planning for maritime 
interdiction mission? 
 
Yes Not Sure No 
8 Can you tell the difference if the 
probability estimate pattern is generated 
by computer instead of human being? 
 
Yes Not Sure No 
9 Will adaptive displace be useful for 
decision-making? 
 
Yes Not Sure No 
10 How does the computer perform in 
generating adaptive display? 
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APPENDIX D: RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE FOR 
VERIFYING THE PLAN GENERATION MODEL MODELS FOR 
MARITIME INTERDICTION 
 
Do you use observation-orientation-decision-
action loop theory as your mental process in 








Does the mental picture formed by the computer 









Does the computer produce meaningful attack 



































Will such a system be useful to assist the human 









Can you tell the difference if the probability 
estimate pattern is generated by computer instead 
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